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Localizing Governance of Systemic Risks: a 
Case Study of the Power of Siberia Pipeline 
in Russia 
Abstract 
For the past three decades, risk has occupied center stage in the energy discourse. Systemic risks 
have proven particularly challenging for government energy planners and corporate executives, as 
they are characterized by their complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, and ability to causing ripple 
effects throughout economic, social, and political structures. In this article we analyze two 
approaches to governing systemic risks arising out of energy mega-projects, one mandated under 
the Russian legal and regulatory regime and one employed by the largely indigenous hunters, 
fishermen, and reindeer herders residing in the Sakha Republic. Our study focuses on the 4000-
kilometer-long natural gas transmission system “Power of Siberia” to be constructed in the sub-
Arctic part of the region. We employ a complimentary and corroborative analysis of legal texts, 
fieldwork observations, semi-structured interviews, and transcripts of official meetings. We 
establish that the approach to risk taken by the people who occupy the land that the Power of 
Siberia traverses could provide a useful insight for handling systemic risks in connection with 
pipeline transportation systems. We also determine that the current Russian legal and regulatory 
regime fails to provide an adequate basis for governing such risks. We conclude the article by 
identifying four pathways for integrating valuable elements of the indigenous approach into the 
current legal and regulatory framework. 
 
I. Introduction 
The term “risk” is en vogue in the energy sector. Helge Lund, former President and CEO of Statoil, 
went as far as to declare that modern oil companies resemble risk management companies, and it is 
hard to disagree. 1 Oil and gas companies of Statoil’s caliber manage complex supply chains, develop 
technologically advanced projects, and forge and maintain alliances with other energy companies, 
national governments, and local communities. They are doing this in the environment of price 
volatility and constantly changing geopolitical landscape.  
Lund’s statement is hardly an anomaly. “Risk” has become an operative word in virtually all 
industrial and service sectors. From bisphenol A contained in infant bottles to “too big to fail” 
financial institutions, risk has become the prism through which the pros and cons of economic 
activities are assessed. This “rise of risk” in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is well 
researched, documented, and conceptualized. This is not say that people did not consider the 
consequences, both positive and negative, of engaging in various activities prior to the modern age; 
they certainly did. However, the rapid proliferation of science and technology in both the 
betterment and destruction of human lives, represented by industrialization and urbanization on 
one side and two world wars on the other, gave risk a defining role in modernity.2  
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The overarching purpose of this article is it to contribute to the investigation of risk’s role in the 
modern energy systems. In order to achieve this objective we compared and contrasted two 
approaches to handling risks, one mandated under the applicable legal and regulatory regime in the 
Sakha Republic located in the Russian North-East and one employed by the largely indigenous 
hunters, fishermen, and reindeer herders residing in the province.i Our investigation targeted 
systemic risks arising out of large energy projects and uses the 4000 kilometer-long natural gas 
transmission system “Power of Siberia” as a case study. (Figure 1) Our ambition was to utilize risk 
theory, and the concept of risk governance in particular, as the departure point, and combine legal 
and ethnographic analysis to investigate the “prescribed” and “implemented” or “applied” models of 
dealing with systemic risks associated with energy mega-projects. 
Figure 1 Gazrpom's Natural Gas Production Fields, Exploration Areas, and Transmission and 
Processing Facilities in Eastern Russia 
Source: gazprom.com3 
 
We attempted to fuse the data and analysis that came from four different studies that span five 
years. We relied on the following sources of data: (1) results of our fieldwork in the Neryungryi and 
Aldanski districts (ulusy) of the Sakha Republic conducted in November 2014 and January-
February 2015; (2) texts of the applicable federal and regional laws and regulations enacted and 
promulgated to assess various impacts of energy projects; and (3) 99 publicly available transcripts 
of Russian presidential official meetings, speeches, and remarks between November 2008 and 
March 2015 in which matters pertinent to the energy sector were discussed.  
Reindeer herders, hunters, and fishermen of the Neryungryi and Aldanski districts of the Sakha 
Republic are ethnically either Yakut (Sakha) or Eveny. Only the latter of which are officially 
recognized as indigenous, while the former count as a non-Russian “titular nation” that has its own 
administrative unit in the Russian Federation called Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). The latter is 
                                                             
i The proper name of the region is the Republic Sakha (Yakutia). The Sakha Republic is a sub-sovereign and 
territorial unit within the Russian Federation. In this article, we use Sakha and Yakutia interchangeably. 
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Russia’s largest territorial unit, where nearly one million people inhabit a territory of just over 3 
million km2.4 While they officially all live in settlements, such as the villages of Iengra and 
Khatystyr, they lead a mobile lifestyle, spending much time in the forest. They often also live in the 
bigger towns of Neryungryi and Aldan, where all the administration and infrastructure is 
concentrated. This multi-sited lifestyle influences their perception of industrial development and its 
associated risks. They easily navigate between “two worlds” that are as different as the concrete 
blocks of a socialist city from the expanses and trails in the taiga. This capacity to switch worlds 
(settings), which has also been mentioned in the ethnographic literature from the Russian Arctic, 
enables them to make local knowledge more relevant for industrial development settings.56  
Fieldwork was carried out using a novel interdisciplinary approach, where an anthropologist and a 
legal scholar together visited the places of planned construction and ongoing industrial 
development. Past experience has shown that local people are particularly concerned with the 
regulatory framework for industrial development, and their rights to participate in decision making 
and implementation, during the project appraisal, planning, formal environmental impact 
assessment (EIA), and construction phases of industrial projects.7 Thus, the fieldwork benefited 
from having a legal specialist and a local livelihood specialist on hand to provide insight into local 
ways of dealing with risk associated with industry projects.  
Following anthropological ethics and local sensitivities, we kept our fieldwork approach 
consciously inductive. The fieldworkers lived for a limited time in the same places and contexts as 
their research partners, thus gaining substantial insights into the principles and most pressing 
questions of local life. This crucial background information significantly informed our thinking and, 
later, our way of writing. The number of person-days in the field (in this case 45), formal interviews 
(14 for this research), or direct quotes in the article cannot reflect the foundations on which this 
data is based. Quantification of such data gained through participant observation rather distorts 
than emphasizes the evidence gained from fieldwork. Though scientists may find participant 
observation data problematic, as they believe it lacks transparency and testability by outsiders, 
such data reveals typical and in-depth principles of local perceptions of risks, priorities, and 
development.8  
Insights gained from living with the people crucially informed the way we conducted semi-
structured and unstructured interviews with people in South Yakutia in the catchment area of the 
Power of Siberia pipeline. The interviewees were chosen based on their ability to give us typical 
and deep insights into every relevant group of local people. For example, when interviewing 
representatives from two major mining companies in Neryungryi, we chose to speak with those 
who deal with company social policies and local content. At the municipal government level, we 
chose to interview employees who are responsible for representing indigenous peoples during 
industry public hearings. Two inhabitants of the Evenki reindeer herding village of Iengra were 
chosen, one an activist from the village, and another a herder from the forest employed by the main 
reindeer herding company. However, leaders and members of indigenous communities (obschiny) 
were most instrumental to our understanding of the local perception of risk and forest dwellers’ 
ideas of companies’ and authorities’ performance in governing extractive industries development. 
Finally, we set up a meeting at the North-Eastern Federal University (NEFU) in Yakutsk to discuss 
the position of the Sakha Republic as steering industrial development and its local impacts.ii 
                                                             
ii This workshop, entitled “Northern small-numbered indigenous people research through the prism of social 
and legal anthropology” was organized by Aytalina Ivanova and took place on 23 January 2015.The workshop 
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Through this combination of interviews, informal conversations, outdoor activities, public 
meetings, and private gatherings, which often took place in people’s kitchens, we gained an 
understanding of how people representing different sections of the Sakha society participate in the 
implementation practices of regulatory frameworks designed to manage risks from industrial 
development.  
For the second data source, we utilized an earlier extensive review of all relevant federal and 
provincial statutes, and regulations promulgated thereunder, co-lead by one of the authors in 
2011.9 This review included laws and regulations on matters involving environmental protection, 
protection of small-numbered indigenous people,10iii distribution and management of on-shore 
mineral resources,11 and development and construction of energy infrastructure.12 As part of our 
analysis, we conducted a currency review of all the relevant legislation and administrative 
regulations by using the Russian legal database Konsultant.13 We have incorporated all of the 
changes made since 2011. We gave corporate standards, rules, and policies a cursory review 
because we determined early in our investigation that these target specific impacts and risks that 
are usually viewed as barriers to project implementation. After the preliminary review, we focused 
our analysis on the Federal Law “On Environmental Review,” the Order of the Committee of the 
Russian Federation on Protection of the Environment dated as of May 16, 2000, and the Law of 
Sakha (Yakutia) “On Ethnological Review in the Areas Traditionally Occupied and Utilized by 
Indigenous Small-numbered People of the Republic Sakha’s (Yakutia) North” (“On Ethnological 
Review”). 
The third source of our data was a byproduct of the “transparent government” policy aggressively 
implemented by the Russian leadership. Starting in mid-2000s, many federal agencies and offices 
started publishing transcripts of official meetings, interviews, and speeches on various government 
websites. The Administration of the President of the Russian Federation has been notably diligent 
at documenting activities of Presidents Putin and Medvedev, particularly starting in the second half 
of 2008. Although it is very likely that not all official conversations and remarks are made available 
to the public, based on our analysis, these transcripts represent a valuable source of data. As a 
preliminary step, we searched the official on-line transcript database of the Office of the Russian 
President for the terms “environment,” “energy,” “oil and gas”, and “risk” (in Russian).14 We then 
conducted a manual preliminary review of all returned records dated between November 2008 and 
March 2015. We selected 99 relevant transcripts for a more in-depth analysis, which we conducted 
with the use of the Atlas.ti software. We employed discourse and content analysis as complimentary 
methods.iv15 
                                                             
included experts from the Commission on the Ethnological Review, scholars, the leader of the union of 
indigenous communities (obschiny) of South Yakutia, and other indigenous activists. 
iii It is important to note that under Federal Law “On Guarantees of Indigenous Small-numbered Peoples’ 
Rights,” an ethnic group must satisfy the following requirements to be recognized as indigenous small-
numbered: (1) reside on traditional ancestral lands; (2) maintain traditional way of life and economic 
activities; (3) have a population of less than 50 thousand people; and (4) identify themselves as a single 
ethnic group.10 
iv We did not provide a list of the reviewed transcripts due to the space constraints but we noted all the 
referenced transcripts in the article. 
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We begin this article with a brief discussion of the risk experts versus laypeople debate in the 
context of the energy sector. We maintain that this theoretical debate has led to significant practical 
implications. We continue with a discussion of one of the key features of energy mega-projects, 
systemic risks. With a focus on risk governance, we transition into an analysis of the indigenous 
approach to risk. We contrast this approach to the approach taken under the applicable federal and 
regional (Sakha) law. We conclude the article by proposing four pathways for integrating valuable 
elements of the indigenous approach into the current legal and regulatory framework. 
II. Risk in the Energy Sector 
The “rise of risk” during the last and current centuries as an important factor in energy decision-
making appears to be the only aspect of the risk discourse upon which people agree. The opinions 
of many government officials, corporate executives, academics, and members of civil society 
diverge on what constitutes risk, how to deal with it, and who should be dealing with it. Below, we 
elaborate on these points of contention. 
One of the authors, while searching for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) definition 
of environmental risk, was surprised to find four.16 Aven and Renn located at least ten common 
definitions of risk while noting that more definitions exist.17 The differences begin with what 
appears to be pure semantics, as the terms “risk,” “hazard,” and “impact” are frequently used 
interchangeably. In some cases, it is a matter of a creative author trying to improve the stylistic 
quality of the work product, and in other cases the preference of one term over another is 
intentional.18 The term “hazard,” according to the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC), 
emphasizes the inherent dangerous properties of the risk agent. 19 The term “risk” on the other 
hand, focuses on potential adverse consequences of a risk agent characterizing them according to 
their probability and magnitude.19 
Policy consequences of overlooking this seemingly academic typology are far from trivial. For 
example, if oil spills are viewed as the primary risk of oil and gas activities, the risk analysis might 
end at their prevention and containment. Yet the adverse consequences do not end with sea birds, 
or in the case of a land pipeline rupture, surrounding vegetation covered in oil.20  During the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster, the economy of several U.S. states came to a standstill, thereby 
jeopardizing livelihoods of millions of households. And it was not just the oil and gas sector that 
experienced a shutdown due to the moratoria imposed on offshore oil and gas activities. The spill 
impacted Floridians, Alabamians, Louisianans, and Texan of many different occupations and trades 
ranging from tourist shop owners to helicopter pilots and from fishermen to restaurant 
employees.21 Thus, a great deal of what adverse consequences are included in the scope of risk 
analysis stems from the very definition of risk.  
Another difference, perhaps the most significant one in understanding of risk, originates in the 
objective versus subjective risk debate. This debate has been instrumental in determining how 
risks are handled and who gets to decide how to handle them. Risk “objectivists” insist that one 
cannot perceive risk because risk is not a tangible thing that people can sense.22 The “subjectivists” 
camp argues that as long as humans assess, evaluate, or appraise risks (at any stage and to any 
degree), the notion of risk cannot be objective.23  The rise of the objective view critique is 
frequently associated with Ulrich Beck and his seminal book, Risk Society: Towards a New 
Modernity. 24  Other scholars, such as Sjöberg, Boholm, Sandman, and Crawford take a reconciliatory 
approach that allows for the coexistence of both views.2526 The approach taken by Eugene Rosa, 
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Otwin Renn, and Aaron McCright in “The Risk Society Revisited” is particularly interesting, as the 
scholars explain this coexistence by recognizing the ontological and epistemological dimensions of 
states of risk.2 The approach does not discard a possibility that events and situations occur 
independently of human perception or cognition while recognizing that as soon as such an event or 
occurrence is deemed to be of human value, it ceases to be an objective notion.2 
According to Adams, the “objectivist” camp favors specially trained professionals, “risk experts,” to 
identify, assess, and manage risks while treating them as “the probability of an adverse future event 
multiplied by its magnitude.”27 The “subjectivist” camp allows for broad participation in risk 
decision-making by the general population, or as it known in the risk literature, “lay-people.”27 In 
the West, this division became particularly acute during the 1980s and early 1990s in the aftermath 
of several significant technological disasters, such as the accident at the Soviet nuclear power plant 
in Chernobyl, Ukraine in 1986.2 After the explosion at the Piper Alpha platform off the coast of 
Scotland in 1988 and the grounding of the Exxon Valdez tanker in 1989, people on both sides of the 
North Atlantic grew uneasy about the dangers of ostensibly bulletproof energy technologies and 
started questioning the competence and values of risk experts.28292 
The public discourse precipitated major advances in risk research in social sciences and 
popularized scholarly literature on risk among masses. For example, the widespread public anxiety 
over the Chernobyl accident made Ulrich Beck’s aforementioned book a bestseller within six 
months of its publication, a rare feat for any scholarly work.2 More importantly, this wave of public 
concern pushed the two sides of the debate into a dialogue on both the academic and policy levels. 
Unfortunately, with the high cost of first attempts to handle risk inclusively combined with fading 
public concern over major technological risks all but nullified many attempts to achieve a 
consensus. On the policy front, technical risk analysis regained its prominence with experts reining 
supreme again. 
Perhaps there is no better illustration of the “objective” view of dominance of risk experts than the 
titles of the two legal statutes that we analyze in detail in Section V. Both feature the word 
“expertiza,” which translates from Russian as “expert review.” Although both allow for some rather 
limited input from laypeople, it is the expert that ultimately decides the fate of a project.v 
The Deepwater Horizon accident on April 20, 2010 that resulted in the largest oil spill in U.S. 
history rekindled the risk debate within the energy sector.21 It also caused a worldwide policy, legal, 
and regulatory response consisting of moratoria, reviews, and changes in the laws and regulations 
that govern oil and gas activities.21 Part of this response was the rise of the notion or risk-based 
regulation premised on the performance-based approach. In fact, the prescriptive model, which is 
the model that the United States had been almost exclusively relying on prior to the accident, 
became a subject of criticism. As part of the regulatory response, the United States adopted the 
Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) rule that requires, among other things, 
operational risk analysis. The revised version of the rule, SEMS II, followed putting emphasis on 
creating safety culture. 30 “Risk based approach” and “risk based regulation” became popular if not 
required buzzwords at oil and gas events creating a validation point for any regulatory or policy 
initiative containing the term “risk.” 3132 
                                                             
v See the discussion in Section V. 
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The Deepwater Horizon disaster and the ensuing regulatory response did not pass unnoticed in 
Russia. In fact, the Russian leadership, including both President Medvedev and President Putin, 
remarked on the significance of the oil spill for reforming the Russian legal and regulatory 
system.3334 The latter went as far as to note potentially devastating consequences of such a spill in 
the Arctic.34vi The former used the accident to build a case for the modernization of the Russian 
legal and regulatory system including incorporation of the performance-based regulatory model.35 
With Russia’s “oil miracle” that propelled the country from the economic cellar to one of the 
booming economies of the first decade of the 21st century came foreign technology and capital.36 
Another item that came and is likely to stay is the global energy vernacular. Risk has become a 
popular term in the official energy discourse in Russia. Our review of the presidential transcripts 
showed that the term “risk” was mentioned 52 times in relation to various aspects of the energy 
sector. Risk appears to be a fixture in the vernacular of the current and previous Russian 
presidents, top government officials, and industry leaders. It has been predominately used to 
highlight the challenges that oil and gas projects face, such as hydrocarbon price volatility.37  
The proliferation of the term “risk” in the Russian energy discourse is hardly surprising. First, 
energy, and oil and gas in particular, lie at the core of the Russian economy. According to the US 
Energy Information Agency (EIA), oil and gas accounted for 68% of Russia’s export and 50% of its 
budget revenues.38 Although these numbers are lower than that of Nigeria or Venezuela, the 
qualitative penetration of the oil and gas sector into all phases of the Russian economy and society 
suggests all-around dependence on hydrocarbon production.3940 In addition, Russia has been and 
for the foreseeable future will remain an integral part of the global energy sector. It is the largest 
natural gas and second largest oil exporter in the world.41 Unlike during Soviet times, Russian 
energy companies are forced to speak the language of the global energy sector. And, as highlighted 
above, this language has “risk” as an operative term. 
III. Risks and Energy Megaprojects 
During the meeting of the Presidential Commission on the Strategic Development of the Fuel and 
Energy Sector and Environmental Security (the “Presidential Energy Commission”) that took place 
on 4 June 2014, President Putin referred to the natural gas sector as sistemoobrazuyuschaya otrasl 
(system-forming sector).42 He clarified that because natural gas is used as fuel and feedstock for 
manufacturing a wide range of products, it is an important factor for “the socio-economic 
development of the country.”42 It is hard to disagree with the Russian leader – in addition to 
providing feedstock and fuel, natural gas is a significant source of export revenue.43 Thus, adverse 
impacts associated with the sector’s activities will not stop within its boundaries; they will affect 
the entire system that it forms. 
In this respect, the Russian leadership has a lot to worry about. In addition to the energy sector 
being the heart and the soul of the Russian economy, it is highly concentrated in terms of the size of 
its projects, as well as the infrastructure and companies that make these projects possible. The 
future of the Russian energy sector appears even more concentrated and centralized as Russian 
                                                             
vi It is important to note that President Putin made his remarks in connection with the protest by Greenpeace 
during which the organization members attempted to board the Prirazlomnaya platform in the Pechora Sea. 
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policy makers are set on exploiting and delivering the country’s vast mineral resources via large-
scale projects, including several new projects in the Russian Artic and sub-Arctic.vii  
Van de Graaf and Sovacool define international mega projects as those that span over at least three 
countries and have over one billion US dollars in capital expenditures.44 One does not need to 
engage in sophisticated economic analysis to see that most if not all projects that the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration noted in the country brief qualify at the very least as national 
“megaprojects.”viii This is certainly true regarding Russia’s oil and gas undertakings in the Arctic 
and sub-Arctic where, aside from smaller developments located on the margins of mature fields, 
every project appears to come with a “mega” designation. For example, the Yamal LNG, an 
international project spearheaded by Novatek, was estimated as of the end of 2013 to require U.S. 
$26.9 billion in capital expenditures.45 The estimated capital expenditures for the infamous 
Prirazlomnoe project are U.S. $5.7 billion, and this figure does not include the costs incurred from 
the original prospecting through field discovery in 1989 through 2002.ix The figures quoted by the 
Russian leadership for the development of the three South Kara Sea license areas are truly 
astronomical. President Putin has referred to estimates of as much as U.S. $500 billion to fully 
develop these resources.46 
The list of Russian energy projects would not be complete without the ambitiously named natural 
gas transmission system “Power of Siberia” used as a case study in this paper. The Power of Siberia 
has the potential to become one of the largest undertakings in the history of oil and gas 
transportation in Russia. The pipeline will tap into the Kovyktinskoe field in the Irkutsk Region with 
natural gas reserves of 1.5 tcm (24 tcf) and the Chayandinskoe field in the Sakha Republic with 
natural gas reserves of 1.2 tcm (19 tcf). Once the pipeline becomes operational, it will transport the 
Kovykniskoe and Chayandinskoe natural gas resources to China for 30 years at the rate of 38 bcm.3 
The Power of Siberia will span approximately 4,000 kilometers and will have an annual capacity of 
61 bcm. It is estimated that the project will cost the contracting parties, Gazprom and China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), $70 billion, with the Russian side responsible for $55 
billion and the Chinese side for $15 billion of total project costs.47 
As Van de Graaf and Sovacool note, massive energy infrastructure comes with economic, social, and 
environmental risks that are often so insurmountable that a megaproject, despite significant 
expenditures, never moves beyond the planning stage.44 We argue that such risks belong to the 
systemic category. However, not all risks in connection with energy megaprojects are of the 
systemic kind. In fact, as we elaborate in Section V, the risks considered during the environmental 
                                                             
vii In addition to new energy projects, expansion of several existing projects, such as trunk oil and gas 
pipelines, are either carried out or planned for the immediate future.38 
viii Because oil is a globally-traded commodity, an argument can be made that all oil development projects 
over one billion US dollars should fall under the Van de Graaf and Sovacool’s definition of an international 
megaproject. A similar argument can be made in relation to LNG projects that reach three or more countries. 
ix There are further uncertainties in addition to more than generous support from the Russian government 
that are likely push the capex figure well above the reported US $5.7 billion.45 
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review of the Power of Siberia are less likely to have the effect of the risks arising out of the natural 
gas transmission system as a whole, which were not within the scope of our review. 
The essence of systemic risk is captured in the following simple but encompassing definition from 
Kaufman and Scott: “the risk of or probability of breakdowns in an entire system, as opposed to 
breakdowns in individual parts or components, and is evidenced by co-movements (correlation) 
among most or all parts.”4849 The IRGC describes systemic risk as “embedded in the larger context 
of societal, financial and economic consequences and is at the intersection between natural events, 
economic, social and technological developments and policy-driven actions.”50  
Klinke and Renn identify the following main characteristics of systemic risks: (1) complexity, (2) 
uncertainty, (3) ambiguity, and (4) ripple effects.51 Complexity refers to challenges of “pairing” the 
multitude of adverse consequences with potentially affected parties, as well as untangling the 
casual connections and determining the feedback loops. Uncertainty refers to the evidentiary 
shortcomings clouding the cause and effect links. Ambiguity allows for several legitimate 
interpretations of the same data set. Lastly, “ripple effects” include secondary impacts separated by 
spatial and temporal gaps from the primary ones and extending into social, economic, and political 
dimensions.51 
The Power of Siberia has the make-up to be one of the largest sources of systemic risks in the 
history of the Russian oil and gas sector. As we show below, the risks associated with its 
construction and operation are complex, uncertain, ambiguous, and capable of causing sizable 
ripple effects. In addition, they have the potential to result in severe environmental, social, 
economic, and political consequences and impact the entire national economic system.  
The Power of Siberia is too complex an undertaking to accurately estimate its social and economic 
effect. Shortly after the agreement between Gazprom and CNPC was officially announced, some 
commentators raised concerns about the project’s socioeconomic and geopolitical viability. For 
example, Morgan Stanley analysts thought so little of the agreement’s economic potential that they 
downgraded Gazprom’s stock “to reflect the signing of the deal with China.”52 Despite President 
Putin’s personal blessing of the project at a ceremony commemorating the start of construction on 
September 1, 2014, the project has been marred by many setbacks.3 Initially, May 2019 was 
announced as the month in which Gazprom was supposed to commence deliveries to China. At the 
time this article was written, the projected deadline was extended by two years, raising further 
concerns about cost overruns due to the delayed deliveries of natural gas. In addition, according to 
some reports, the Chinese side froze financing of the project. 53 This prompted some analysts to 
suggest that the Power of Siberia, despite years of negotiations, exploration, and preconstruction, 
might never become a reality.53  
The high stakes of this project, the geopolitical outcome of a failure to execute it is uncertain. The 
Russian leadership presented the Power of Siberia as the first step to diversify its natural gas 
export markets away from the European Union. The announcement of the CNPC-Gazprom deal 
came at a time when many wondered how Russia would handle the cooling of its relationship with 
a strategic energy-trading partner. Whereas the deal announcement scored the Kremlin many 




The Power of Siberia’s future is clad in ambiguity. On the one hand, it could be seen as a stable and 
long-term contractual relationship that is projected to serve as the economic basis for the 
development of a region that occupies 60 percent of Russia’s territory but is occupied by only 10 
percent of its population.55 On the other hand, it is a mammoth system with downstream and 
midstream components that currently relies on a single market, China. Two-thirds of the 
transmission system’s capacity is dedicated to the deliveries pursuant to the CNPC–Gazprom deal. 
However, unless the construction phase under the agreement is performed in full, Gazprom’s 
ambitions regarding the remaining one-third of the transmission capacity, domestic use or 
diversification of additional exports, will not come to fruition.  
A halt in the midst of the project’s construction or operation phases will certainly send sizable 
ripples throughout the East Siberia and Far East regions of Russia. Unpaid salaries and forced 
relocations, displaced subsistence economies and closing small businesses, and marginalization and 
eventually eradication of indigenous cultures and livelihoods will be among the socio-economic 
impacts associated with the potential failure. Abandoned and mishandled equipment, undisposed 
hazardous materials, as well as forest and tundra landscape stripped of vegetation in preparation 
for roads and supporting infrastructure, will create multiple sources for environmental risks. 
IV. Local Approach to Handling Risk 
Governing systemic risks 
Systemic risks, including risk arising in connection of energy mega-project akin to the Power of 
Siberia, provide a particular set of challenges. The conventional risk analysis, which consists of risk 
assessment, risk management, and risk communication, lacks the capacity for taking a broad view 
of potential risks, incorporating multiple qualitatively divergent data points, as well as establishing 
causal ties and connections expressed often by different groups of risk experts. More importantly 
the conventional risk analysis lacks the capacity for reconciling such differences in a transparent, 
socially and politically acceptable manner.2  
In the mid-1990s an integration of analysis and deliberation emerged as a plausible platform for 
handling systemic risks. 21950 This precipitated the advent of a more refined model for handling 
systemic risks: risk governance.56 Risk governance is based on the notion of collective decision-
making drawing on the participation of a mixture of private and state actors acting pursuant to 
formal and informal rules.2 It fuses the traditional risk analysis with collective decision-making. As 
a result, risk analysis becomes a part of the applicable political, administrative, corporate, and 
legislative processes, benefiting from the additional controls and safeguards built into them while 
also suffering from their shortcomings. Although we can argue about the overall societal value of 
risk governance vis-à-vis traditional risk analysis, one thing is certain – risk governance ostensibly 
challenges the hegemony of risk experts. It does so by adding actors who can openly question and 
sometimes overrule experts on non-scientific, ethical, political, and legal grounds.  
The framework of risk governance introduced by IRGC adds two more phases, pre-assessment and 
characterization/evaluation.50 Thus, the risk governance process consists of the following five 
steps: pre-assessment, appraisal (scientific risk assessment and concern assessment), 
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characterization and evaluation, management, and communication.19 The first four phases are 
sequential and the fifth, risk communication, is meant to serve as an internal and external bridge. 
The IRGC framework is encompassing, holistic, and flexible, especially considering that it is 
designed to conceptualize a relatively young concept. It is also an evolving framework, which is 
evident from the IRGC work as well as the work of risk governance scholars. Klinke and Renn, for 
example, recognized the excessive rigidity of the IRGC’s framework and offered a more flexible 
approach. Their model allows for more adaptation to the risk at hand, as well as for more 
integration with available capacities to handle the risks.57  
Notwithstanding the differences, both frameworks feature the epistemic and socio-political aspects. 
The epistemic aspect focuses on knowledge acquisition, and the socio-political aspect is centered on 
collective decision-making. Thus, both frameworks do not dwell on the differences in the objective 
and subjective views of risk. More importantly for the purposes of this article, the epistemic aspect 
of risk governance under both frameworks is not limited to labs, supercomputers, and statistical 
averages. Therefore, at least in terms of identifying risks, knowledge can come from a plethora of 
sources, including those labeled by risk experts as unjustified fears of citizenry.  
Some of these fears may mean little to a private industrial actor. After all, oil and gas companies, as 
well as the numerous members of their supply chains, are generally not responsible for the 
assessment of indirect impacts of industrial development. Such impacts include, for example, 
decrease in the capacity of the local subsistence economy and thus resilience to the economic ups 
and downs associated with commodity-based economic development. Governments, on the other 
hand, as insurers of last resort, are responsible for an isolated community that is left without 
sufficient hunting grounds or reindeer pastures, and thus sufficient means to survive a long and 
brutal winter. Unfortunately, governments often fail not only at recognizing their responsibility to 
take such risks into account but also dealing with the adverse consequences when they 
materialize.58   
There have been previous studies on attempts to integrate traditional knowledge into decision-
making and governance of industry projects, and management in general. There is little literature 
on this topic with a Russian indigenous focus,59 though this is a very advanced field in the North 
American Arctic.60 There, this integration is in many cases around the topic of co-management of 
resources.616263 This is particularly true for environmental impact assessment, which is an obvious 
starting point, as it is widely assumed that indigenous knowledge is “TEK”, meaning it is about the 
natural environment.64 Stevenson highlighted twenty years ago that this is too narrow an 
assumption, because indigenous knowledge is not only about the environment, but also about a 
holistic system. Indeed, the strength of that knowledge is in its interconnectedness as a complex 
system, where changes in any one factor influence others. Knowing these interconnections is of 
tremendous value, certainly for purposes of risk governance.  
One reason why this linking of local ways of knowing and governing systemic risks may not have 
been attempted explicitly thus far may lie in the incompatibility of what Nadasdy has called the 
managerial approach.63 The managerial approach is based on a worldview where the environment’s 
only value is as a storehouse for capitalist resource extraction, even when such extraction is termed 
sustainable. Nadasdy has also explained how the success stories of co-management actually fail to 
produce that real integration that Stevenson identified in 1996 as key for success in incorporating 
indigenous knowledge into EIAs. The reason is systemic – that engaging in such efforts for local 
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people may alienate them from the worldview that they actually need to live in order to enact their 
ways of knowing their environment. Stammler and Ivanova have argued that, especially in the 
Russian context, it is illusionary to aim for an eye-to-eye integration, which will just lead to defeat 
of the indigenous worldview.65 Rather, pragmatic solutions that satisfy companies, indigenous 
peoples, and authorities can be found in particular situations where the indigenous partners accept 
a niche that is granted to them by the dominant extractivist managerial system, as we have shown 
with the Nenets Autonomous Okrug.  
Nadasdy calls for a re-evaluation of co-management agreements on political terms,62 which is 
echoed by O'Faircheallaigh’s finding that theory on indigenous people and extractive industries 
underplays the capacity of the former to exploit certain political configurations66. The implications 
of this finding are foremost regional, as O'Faircheallaigh argues. This echoes what we have found in 
Yakutia, where the opportunities for indigenous agency to influence the ways in which extractive 
industries impact people are on the local and regional levels more so than on the national (Russian 
Federal) level. Ingold and Kurttila (emphasize that this way of knowing must be understood “as 
generated in the practice of locality.”67  
In the Western Arctic, the literature on integrating indigenous ways of knowing revolves around 
the concept of co-management and participation. In Russia, then, the corresponding instrument 
around which this revolves is the ethnological review (ER). ER is a process of impact assessment on 
culture and society of those indigenous and local people who use the land in a traditional way and 
will be affected by industrial development. Murashko highlighted the potential for partnerships 
between anthropologists and indigenous local residents in carrying out such a review,68 and 
actively carried out such projects, for example among the European Nenets jointly with their 
indigenous association.6970  
Novikova regularly carries out such reviews by order of the industrial companies.71 Such reviews 
consider local and indigenous ways of knowing through the anthropologist’s fieldwork data. 
Moreover indigenous politicians have an influence on the research design, and its results, through 
their membership in the commission that accepts the review. Subsequently, these indigenous 
politicians can also become coauthors of any written product that comes out of such reviews.72 
While Novikova has practically established an entire field in Russia for the legal anthropological 
expertise required for such reviews, there is not yet literature on how such incorporation of local 
indigenous knowledge would work if it were legally required.73 All the above-mentioned works are 
based on voluntary action, and commissioning of such reviews by companies, authorities or 
indigenous peoples Associations themselves. Only since 2010 is there a law in Russia that makes 
this kind of review mandatory.7  
Local ways of handling risk in East Siberia 
Not all fears about risks are alike. As we argue below, the way of handling risk that we observed 
during our fieldwork provides not only a valuable contribution to risk identification during the 
initial (pre-assessment or pre-estimation) phase of risk governance, it can serve as a model for risk 
identification and evaluation in energy megaprojects.57 It also has further potential to be considered 
during risk management as energy projects are being implemented. For the purposes of this article, 
we referred to this way of dealing with risk as “local.” This designation applies to all indigenous 
people as well as others who live close to the natural environment and use it in a way specified in 
the Law “On Guarantees of Indigenous Small-numbered Peoples’ Rights” 
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The people and their livelihood amidst industry have been subject to previous study, most notably 
due to their previous experience with the ESPO pipeline construction. The works by Yakovleva 
provide excellent complementary evidence for the framework presented here. 74 75 76 77 However, 
they do not have a risk orientation. They focus more on the relevant federal legislation and how this 
legislation lack implementation on the ground, analyzing implications for the people more as 
passive objects of rights and duties, rather than as agents in risk governance. Yakovleva’s most 
recent chapter provides important insights from local people, including the village of Khatystyr in 
Aldan district, on the impact of pipeline construction.77 However, it does not consider the changes 
in the legal and regulatory framework since 2010, when Russia’s first law on ethnological review 
was adopted in the Sakha Republic and made local participation in impact assessment mandatory.78 
The drafting and adoption process of this law itself can be seen as one local approach to governing 
systemic risks.7 
Sirina and Fondahl’s paper employs the term of risk and people’s perception thereof, but does not 
use a risk-theory frame. Instead, it focuses on the concerns about the disconnect between de jure 
indigenous rights and the realities of marginalization on the ground if the pipeline were to run 
through their hunting grounds in the neighboring region, Zabaikalye.79 Both Yakovleva and Fondahl 
and Sirina restrict their analysis to Evenki only, while Ivanova’s article illustrates the legal 
inconsistencies that surrounded the pipeline’s construction through Yakutia, where the lack of 
regional legislation for cultural social impact assessment was identified, a point that was later 
repeated by Yakovleva.80 75 76 77 79 These works form important starting points and give rise to the 
question of how lessons from such past experience like the ESPO pipeline are now being considered 
in the region. In particular, we shall explore in greater detail how regional regulatory documents in 
place, such as the Sakha Law on ethnological review, reflect the risks perceived by people on the 
ground. 
These people do not perceive the risk in the conventional meaning of the term; they live in and with 
it. The process of everyday living marks their key expertise. The day-to-day engagement draws 
upon the ancestral experience spanning multiple generations. But this experience is being enacted 
by everyday challenges and processes. This process-oriented approach is also what some of the 
existing literature on TEK and indigenous knowledge integration has highlighted.67 85 When this 
way of knowing is “compared” to scientific knowledge, or put into databases, or “tapped into,” this 
way of knowing loses its context and thus also its explanatory potential for addressing systemic risk 
governance in the industry. The scholarly community is divided between those who see this 
challenge as insurmountable8182, and those who argue for being aware of it and using appropriate 
toolkits for realizing its potential. 83 
This is hardly the heuristics that the “expert” side of the risk debate often criticizes.84 It is not based 
on individual experiences over one’s lifetime. Rather, it is premised on individual experience 
collected over centuries, therefore providing an extensive set of historically embedded wisdom. It 
resembles a sophisticated simulation that is run tens of thousands and even a hundred-thousand 
times. Every time it is run, it experiences an additional layer of detail and sophistication due to the 
individual and collective practice by human agents on the land. Therefore, we caution against too 
simplistic use of what has been called “traditional knowledge” as “data” that can be put into 
databases just like figures.85 Moreover, the costs of misrecognition, mis-assessment, and 
mismanagement are measured in individual lives, families, and whole communities.  
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This is not to say that indigenous expertise cannot be valuable for the conventional risk analysis. 
Given the fact that no group of actors has deeper experience and knowledge of the land under 
which the resources are located, or on which the pipeline runs, risks identified and managed by the 
forest-dwellers in the context of subsistence economy may also matter for industrial planning. It 
was a common occurrence during our recent fieldwork in Yakutia, as well as during our previous 
expeditions in the region to encounter indigenous peoples scratching heads over some 
questionable decisions made by developers. For example, why would one want to build a pipeline 
in an area where hunters have known for generations that the ground is especially unstable due to 
frequent thawing and freezing cycles on discontinuous permafrost? Or would it not cause 
unnecessary trouble to build a container settlement for fly-in / fly-out workers on the site of a 
graveyard, one that is in addition to that also infected with anthrax bacteria that stay in the ground 
for many generations? Or can industrialisers really be sure that the warnings by indigenous 
practitioners that sacred sites such as shamans’ graves must remain intact and untouched by 
industrial development, otherwise the spirits may get angry - are all empty suspicions? Even in the 
atheist Soviet Union many geologists and oilmen, some of whom had extensive scientific 
background stayed away from such sites for ostensibly unscientific reasons. In cases where they do 
not stay away – often the indigenous people see the consequences in disasters that happen as a 
result of such disrespect. During the exploration of the Bovanenkovo gas field for example, a drill 
rig caught fire when it was put on a place close to a sacred site of the Nenets reindeer nomads, 
while another one fell into a lake which had been identified by the nomads as host of water spirits 
responsible for fish resources of the area.86x   
Therefore, indigenous people’s “data” regarding their land could be useful not only for 
consideration at the early planning stages of industrial development, it could also potentially save 
human life, and thus has potential for risk management before and during industrial project 
implementation. However, as we argue below, it is not the indigenous “data” but rather the 
indigenous way of approaching risks in connection with their land that represents the utmost value 
for risk governance of energy mega projects. It is this difference between scientific knowledge and 
indigenous ways of knowing, between static replicable non-contextual “data” and contextual 
process that also makes it so difficult to integrate the two worldviews in impact assessment.83 82 
The indigenous way is largely phenomenological, as we outline in the next section, hence allowing 
for the inclusion of other (than pure epistemological) aspects in the decision-making process. i It is 
important to note that the principal reason for noting other aspects (e.g. ethical) is to highlight the 
encompassing nature of the phenomenological approach, allowing for the coexistence of epistemic 
and ethical dimensions side by side. It does not focus exclusively on the “system” side of things 
while leaving “lifeworld” at home. After all, for an indigenous forest dweller, his home is also the 
home of the economic system of which she is an integral part. In addition to reliance on having a 
holistic picture, the indigenous way of approaching risks does not have an “expiration date.” It 
employs the perpetual or near perpetual temporal continuity of experience and practice. 
                                                             
x This point is beautifully illustrated in the film “Zloy Dukh Yambuya” when desperate geologists in the end 
rely on an old Evenki hunter to help them explain the disappearance of their colleague in the mountains. 




To describe the unity of what Habermas identified as “lifeworld” and “systems”2 that indigenous 
people living on the land preserved, many anthropologists use all-embracing terms “human-agent 
in the environment”,87 a “larger worldview that influences how people perceive and define 
reality”64, “sentient ecology”88, or “partnership approach”.7 These terms are grounded in a 
phenomenological approach that emphasizes the importance of continued human practice for the 
perception of the environment and consequently also the risks from engaging with that 
environment. Local hunters, herders, and fishermen, including our fieldwork partners in the 
catchment area of the Power of Siberia pipeline, experience their environment through interaction 
with its other beings or objects. That interaction always has a certain intention, and thus the 
experience is directed as experience of some other subject or object. This lies at the heart of 
phenomenology and89 intentionality influences what kind of affordance the human agent perceives 
of the environment through practice with other objects or beings in that environment. xi 90 85 
Correspondingly, her intentionality makes her see those affordances that are most useful for 
sustaining a particular livelihood. We shall illustrate this phenomenological experience of local 
people with condensed insights from fieldwork. 
The local hunter or herder sees in the forest the affordance of a homeland, and feeding and 
migration grounds for those wild animals for which he hunts. Most likely, that forest is for him also 
inhabited by spirits that govern the animals and plants of that forest.  
In contrast, the pipeline builder sees in the forest the affordance of an obstacle for the route of the 
pipe, and looks for the best routes to be cleared of vegetation. Thereafter he may see the affordance 
of the cut timber as a pool of construction material and heating fuel. The difference between the 
indigenous and industrialist’s affordances of the forest is that in the former affordance the forest is 
important as a live resource, as a host for practice, whereas in the latter case, the forest becomes 
important as a dead resource. 
The meeting of these two meanings of the forest may collide when – as in our fieldwork in 
Neryungryi and Khatystyr – the forest dweller is engaged in clear-cutting the forest for the 
company that is subcontracted by the Power of Siberia pipeline. The Grigorievy from the Bugat 
community had opted for this. They had to see the affordance of the forest as a straight pipeline 
corridor, in contrast to their own worldview of the forest as hunting ground crisscrossed by trails of 
animals, trap lines, and walkable human pathways. While they were not talking with enthusiasm 
about this, they did so clearly with the idea of agency. Rather than being passive victims of 
development, they wanted to be participants. They also requested to have education of their 
children paid for by the company as a condition in the agreement between the community and the 
company.91 
Hunters like the Grigorievy see walkability along trails that they co-use with the animals. These 
trails give them moral entitlements to their forest, as they take and give resources from and to the 
forest. The pipeline cuts their animals’ and their own paths of movement. For the oil and gas 
workers, the pipeline enables movement (in this case, natural gas to China), while for the locals the 
                                                             
xi The term from Gibson (1976) was introduced to anthropology by Tim Ingold in1992.  
16 
 
pipeline is like a road block, making part of their forest inaccessible.92xii The trails for movement of 
local animals and people circumvent areas where the permafrost is too discontinuous and turns the 
ground into bogs, while other seasonal movement of the ground is accommodated by these trails. 
The pipeline builder is concerned, as is the hunter, with the support that the ground can give in 
different seasons for transport corridors. Melting spots of permafrost and moving ground are 
potentially dangerous for pipeline corridors, as are sudden temperature differences, as the pipes 
have limited material tolerance and need to be especially prepared before the joints are welded and 
then sunk in the ground or on foundations. For the properties of the land desired by the pipeline 
builder, the way of knowing the land of the hunter can be extremely helpful. “[Y]ou have to feel the 
different temperature regimes of the pipeline, during the day and night time. The pipe “jumps” 
expands and contracts. The tube got warmer during the daytime, and lies on the foundation a bit 
elevated, and then in the evening, it evens out, and that’s the moment when you need to weld the 
connection. Good welders know their timing in those conditions.” 93 This quote from the field by a 
Gazprom pipeline builder shows how also industrial workers could start “feeling” the land, 
resulting in a safer and more efficient pipeline design and construction. 
However, this is different from incorporating local epistemologies into the process of industrial 
decision-making. Such incorporation only marginally improves identification and evaluation of 
systemic risks associated with energy megaprojects. The main risk identified by indigenous forest 
dwellers is that they get deprived of their main source of livelihood – the environment that they 
know and of which they feel part. For this reason, they feel a stewardship kind of responsibility for 
this environment – they need it in a clean state that they know in order to work for their living, 
mostly as hunters, fishers, and reindeer herders. The inhabitants of the forest, as well the industry, 
perceive this risk to be of an environmental kind. However, it is clearer for the former than for the 
latter that an environmental risk is not limited to the state of the physical environment. Any 
interference with the environment has social and cultural consequences.  
The view of risk is therefore a holistic one, as indigenous forest dwellers do not separate between 
nature and culture, between humans, animals and the environment that all beings share. For a 
pipeline builder, the view of risk is limited to the risks to the project. The developer does not need 
to think about the overall impact of the billions of cubic meters of gas moving through the pipeline 
including the adverse impacts of the commodity-centric economic development and environmental 
impacts at the point of extraction and consumption. It does not need to consider the possibility of a 
regulatory capture of the local government by the developer or virtually any impact on the local 
and regional socio-political life. It is therefore hard for an indigenous mind to understand how the 
industry and the regional authorities can isolate environmental problems during, for example an 
environmental assessment process and not simultaneously consider the social and cultural 
implications associated with the environmental issues under review. 
As the results of our fieldwork in Sakha showed, unlike developers, indigenous people on the land 
do not focus on individual activities or projects. For them it does not matter which company or 
project actually interferes with their lives. They have on the one hand the bigger picture, thinking in 
terms of their movement on their land, together with all other beings on that land, formed by their 
intentional experience as agents in their environment.  They have on the other hand a hard time 
keeping track of all the different subcontractors, sometimes not even knowing for which big project 
                                                             
xii This view is not specific to our own fieldwork only. Other colleagues report similar setups from their field.92  
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they work, and to whom they should talk. Correspondingly, one of the greatest risks identified by 
indigenous people is the loss of information about factors impacting their land. This sometimes 
becomes so overwhelming that people feel completely powerless in the face of industrial 
development. Some simply stay in the forest and become invisible to the formal processes 
associated with the development. In the most unfortunate of all possible outcomes, some choose to 
take their own lives if they feel trapped in the maze of industrial development.  
We are familiar with such instances of suicide in Yamal. It would be hard for some to picture such a 
“maze” on what is commonly regarded as the “middle of nowhere.” However, large industrial 
projects are hardly a rarity, especially for those indigenous groups that rely on the movement over 
vast space for subsistence. For example, the following industrial projects are located on the 
territory of Bugat obschina: (1) the Timir iron ore mine and processing facility; (2) the 
Kankunskaya hydro power station (under construction); (3) the Kankunskaya – Neryungri high 
voltage transmission line (under construction); (4) the Maly Nimnyr – Kankunskaya hydro power 
station motorway (under construction); and (5) the Power of Siberia pipeline. Aytalina Grigorieva 
from the Bugat community illustrates sadly how her people experience each and every project on 
their land, not as separate entities, but as layers one on top of the other. This impressively shows 
how their bigger picture of industry is composed as layers of individual and detailed experiential 
vistas on their land. For example, the experience of the Power of Siberia construction agreement is 
composed of experiencing the negotiations of quarry construction, of electric line construction, of 
forest clear-cuttings, or road construction, and other activities, each of which is carried out by 
different incoming agents on the community’s land. While each of the industrial agents sees 
themselves as independent and separate from the rest, the Grigorievy from the Bugat community 
see all of them as small layers of the big industrial change that comes to their land.94  
The holistic approach does not separate analysis from deliberation. Living in and with risk 
effectively means that memory, skill, and learning are utilized in the context of everyday collective 
decision-making, subject to often instant or near instant accountability. The difference between 
forest dwellers and industrial ways of handling risks is visible when people feel abandoned by the 
officials that they elected, as the officials become more and more integrated into the state 
bureaucracy. xiii This became especially clear, for example, when talking to the local bureaucrat in 
Aldan who was responsible for the public hearings that took place in connection with the Power of 
Siberia pipeline. While all the legal protocols were followed and all of the hearings archived, he had 
for some reason not even invited a clan-community (obschina) representative to the organizing 
commission of the hearings. Asked about the reason, he replied that the hearings were for the 
construction of sand quarries for the pipeline, and on those projected sites there was no indigenous 
community activity, so the quarries would be irrelevant for them (structured interview, Palamutov, 
Aldan, 31.01. 2015).  
The problem lies in the fact that indigenous- or local-activists-turned-politicians have to subscribe 
to the state political system, and therefore are forced to think in the same electoral terms. That 
identity becomes more important during their political tenure than their identity as practitioners 
on the land. Sometimes this brings them in disagreement with their own relatives on the land – 
                                                             
xiii This situation has been beautifully but sadly described by Nadasdy in “Hunters and Bureaucrats.”61 
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unless they make sure that those relatives benefit from the political involvement of their kin 
thereby becoming part of the state political system. 
Temporal continuity 
Another important feature of the indigenous way of handling risk is temporal continuity of their 
practice and experience on the land. This does not mean that all risks last forever. The temporal 
continuity amounts to the continuity of responsibility over risks. Simply put, the responsibility to 
handle risks and educate the successors on how handle them is not restricted by an insurance 
policy term or liability limit. It is not limited by a public official’s tenure. It entails acting as the 
insurer of the last resort in perpetuity with little individual capacity to “get out.”  
The perception of time and space among indigenous northerners is part of their specific culturally 
embedded practice on the land95. There is a clear awareness among them that the extractive 
industry presence in the Russian Arctic and sub-Arctic is a rather short intermezzo in the long 
history of human habitation on the land. However, this short intermezzo – if it lasts 50 or 100 years 
– can have long-term consequences for local indigenous people.  
The main risk identified by indigenous people is the viability of a forest life for future generations. 
There is a profound concern that if the hunting, fishing, and herding grounds are depleted or made 
unusable by industry, the people who know life in the forest today will not be able to transmit their 
way of perceiving and knowing the environment to their children and grandchildren. This is 
especially critical for societies like the Evenki where learning does not take place in school but 
while doing and practicing, In the forest, two generations of interrupted practice on the land can 
have a detrimental effect on this Arctic and sub-Arctic society long after the natural gas fields are 
depleted and “the blue fuel” stops making its way southeast.  
The results of our fieldwork showed that as a general rule, a politician or administrator thinks in 
four- to twelve-year election terms; a pipeline developer thinks in 30- to 40-year-long 
infrastructure lifecycles that are further separated by phases of project development and operation; 
and a hunter or herder thinks in terms of rolling generations of sustainable livelihood on the land. 
As our quote above shows, as does other field conversations, local and indigenous people see not 
only their own life, but also industry in longer time cycles. Martynov from Khatastyr immediately 
connected industry to his ancestors search for gold with geologists riding reindeer. However, we 
have also witnessed exceptions, where indigenous inhabitants are ready to sacrifice longer-term 
stability for shorter-term economic benefits promised by industrial development, or hunters 
overhunting their prey to cash out on the sudden demand for fur or game meat. We have also met 
very careful and responsible industrial developers, like Valentin Ivanov (see quote above), who 
have developed close relationship with the land and would rather be deliberate and inclusive in 
implementing ambitious projects such as pipelines.xiv96 
The temporal continuity practiced by indigenous communities and the much shorter-term 
commitment employed by some industrial actors have a notable substantive distinction. Whereas 
the latter concentrate on the impacts during the project duration and the most responsible of the 
lot include impacts after the project is over, the former look at the project as part of the continuous 
                                                             
xiv Bolotova’s article relies on similar fieldwork and contains some more such evidence on the closeness of 
some industrial developers with the land in the Arctic.96  
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process of living on the land. Thus, an industrial project might end an indigenous person’s life as 
she knows it if the disruption caused by the project interrupts the practice that she and her 
ancestors sustained for generations. Unlike the industrial actor, she will not be able to move on to 
another project, location, or another country. Her land, herd, hunting and fishing grounds, and 
everything surrounding them is all she knows and all she built her life around.  
V. Risk Governance of the Energy Sector under the Applicable Legal and 
Regulatory Framework 
As mentioned above, governance involves collective decision-making pursuant to formal and 
informal rules. Although it is conceivable to envisage scenarios featuring risk governance without 
government and thus formal rules, it is virtually impossible to imagine how governance of systemic 
risks will not rely, at least to some degree, on formal rules. “First, government, represented by 
politicians and/or regulators is usually an integral part of systemic risk governance and 
government usually acts pursuant to formal rules. Second, even if for some reason government is 
not present or if its representatives do not act pursuant to formal rules, formal rules serve as the 
fallback governance structure if an involved stakeholder group is dissatisfied by the deliberation 
and/or analysis governed by informal rules. For example, a stakeholder group (an environmental 
NGO or an indigenous community) challenge a risk governance process based on a company’s 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) program in a domestic or international tribunal. Third, a 
systemic risk governance framework premised on informal rules still needs to comply with the 
formal requirements set forth by the national legal and regulatory regime. For example, parties 
cannot opt out of an environmental assessment if law requires it.  
The question of which formal rules, and thus, which part of a legal and regulatory regime applies to 
risk governance remains to be explored sufficiently. Legal scholarship on risk has focused heavily 
on the rules for traditional risk assessment.97 A few authors who explored broader legal issues 
related to risk converged on the epistemological aspect of risk governance, while paying little 
attention to the socio-political context in which risk is analyzed. For example, Sunstein in Laws of 
Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle made a compelling case against strict implementation of 
the precautionary principle.98 However, he did not fully acknowledge the importance of inclusive 
deliberation for societal risk acceptance, as well as the ethical foundation of distribution of risks 
and benefits.  
Because of the risk characteristics of energy mega-projects noted above, the risk governance 
process must commence at the level and point of time when the decision whether to proceed with a 
project or activity is made. For example, before deciding whether to open new areas of the 
Norwegian continental shelf for petroleum activities, the Norwegian parliament must conduct a 
public consultation. As a result, stakeholder groups have an opportunity further comment on 
economic, social, and environmental impacts of the proposed development under two strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA) and one site-specific environmental assessment frameworks.xv97 
As we elaborate in the remainder of the chapter, Russia lacks similar institutional capacity for 
systemic risk governance, especially for trunk pipeline systems. Public consultation is not required 
                                                             
xv It is important to note that we provide this example to highlight the capacity for systemic risk governance 
that exists under the Norwegian legal and regulatory regime.97 
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at the policy-making stage. When public input is solicited, its purpose and impact are difficult to 
trace.97 The only national-level legal mechanism for bringing deliberation into risk analysis that we 
identified is environmental assessment. Because part of the pipeline’s route will traverse the Sakha 
Republic, it is subject to the provincial ethnological review law providing an additional opportunity 
for deliberation that centers on indigenous issues.  
The Federal Law “On Environmental Review” sets forth the process of ekologicheskaya ekspertiza 
that amounts to environmental assessment. The process consists of the following two steps: (1) 
preparation and conducting of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) or otsenka vozdeystviya 
na okruzhaiyschuiy sredu (OVOS); and (2) official government review and certification of the EIA, 
state environmental review (SER).xvi Although the Law on “On Environmental Review” provides 
some capacity for deliberation and inclusiveness via public participation, this capacity is restricted 
by the scope of the statute, as well as little practical effect of that the public participation has on the 
decision-making process. 
The principal objective of the statute is the prevention of negative environmental impacts.99 This 
effectively means that other impacts, socio-economic impacts, for example, are not within the scope 
of the statute. We do not intend this statement to be criticism of “On Environmental Review.” After 
all, it is uncommon for environmental assessment laws to extend into the socio-economic realm. 
Rather, our criticism applies to the rest of the Russian legal and regulatory regime that lacks the 
capacity provide due assessment to such impacts. 
Moreover, the scope of “On Environmental Review” was further restricted by multiple amendments 
to the statute since its enactment in 1995. According to the former Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, 
about 5 per cent of the activities within the original scope of the statute were remaining in 2010.100 
For the purposes of this article, the most significant amendment came in light of the enactment of 
the federal City Building Code on 18 December 2006. Pursuant to these amendments, trunk 
pipelines were taken out of the purview of the law “On Environmental Review.” Only the pipelines 
located offshore and the pipelines traversing highly protected environmentally sensitive areas were 
remained within the scope. Instead of environmental review, trunk pipelines became subject to a 
state expert review under the City Building Code that boils down to a review of project plans and 
technical drawings.101 
Thus, it should not come as a surprise that the Power of Siberia project as a whole never underwent 
an environmental review. Instead, only several units of the supporting infrastructure having 
secondary bearing on the successful operation of the pipeline remained subject to mandatory 
environmental assessment. At the time this article was written, seven waste disposal sites near 
compressor (pumping) stations were undergoing SER.102  
As mentioned above, the first phase of environmental assessment under Russian law is OVOS, 
which is conducted by the proponent of the activity. Pursuant to the 16 May 2000 Order of the 
Committee of the Russian Federation on Protection of the Environment (Order 372), the processes 
commences with the proponent of the activity submitting a notice to government authorities with 
preliminary information about the planned activity and OVOS including the so-called tekhnicheskoe 
                                                             
xvi We retained the Russian acronym (OVOS) for the first step of the process and the English acronym (SER) 
for the second step to avoid confusion between the entire process environmental review (assessment) and 
the second step state environmental review (assessment).  
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zadanie (technical assignment). The proponent then conducts all the necessary research and 
collects all the necessary data. Under “On Environmental Review” does not explicitly create the 
right to public participation in the environmental assessment process. However, the statute 
mandates that materials sent to SER reflect public opinion thereby indirectly requiring 
obschestvennoe obsuzhdenya (public discussions).99 The Order 372 extends this requirement 
further by placing the responsibility for organizing “public discussions” on the proponent of the 
activity. It is important to note that the Order 372 uses the term “public discussions” in all but two 
instances when it refers to the process as “consultation.”103 Under the Order 372, the developer 
conducts “public discussions” with the municipal government making it, at least in theory, a more 
inclusive process.  
It is important to note that Order 372 sets the following two principal objectives of public 
discussion: (1) informing the public about the proposed activity; and (2) identifying public 
preferences.103 The latter objective translates into the statutory requirement of taking public 
preferences in to account when making the final decision on the proposed project or activity. 
However, neither the “On Environmental Review” nor Order 372 specify the extent and ways in 
which the preferences need to be considered in the decision-making process.  
Public meetings are not mandatory as surveys or referendums also may be used to inform the 
public and determine its preferences.103 The proponent of the activity must carefully document 
public discussion results, include them in the draft OVOS materials and allow the public to examine 
and comment on the draft. Availability of other modes of “public discussions” notwithstanding, we 
found that it is customary to conduct a public meeting. In fact, developers face significant public 
opposition when they do not follow this practice. For example, in 2006, during the environmental 
assessment of the East Siberia – Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline, Transneft, the pipeline developer, 
along with federal and state authorities attempted to use approval by Sakha President’s Public 
Consultation Council as a form of “public discussion.” Moving public discussion into the “halls of 
power” when the technical documentation and preliminary OVOS materials were not completed 
drew ire from Sakha environmental NGOs.104 In a joint letter to the Sakha President, the 
environmentalists pointed out that the Consultation Council failed to consider several important 
factors ranging from environmental and climatic conditions to potentially irreversible damage to 
indigenous communities due to damage to reindeer migration routes and fishing and hunting 
grounds.105 
Gazprom did not repeat the Transneft’s mistake with the Power of Siberia and organized public 
meetings as part of the OVOS. However, Gazprom’s responsibilities did not include the assessment 
of the entire pipeline because of the aforementioned December 2006 amendments to “On 
Environmental Review.” Interestingly, the public meetings conducted in Sakha did not attract 
nearly as much attention as in the ESPO’s case. Although we cannot point at a single reason for such 
a public apathy, we deem a combination of the following factors primary responsible.106xvii 
Evenki from Olekminskiy and Aldanskiy districts of Sakha petitioned Gazprom in 2010 to plan the 
pipeline route parallel to that of ESPO’s. Remarkably, Olekmenskiy district Evenki volunteered to 
take the burden of another pipeline.7 In addition, only isolated waste disposal sites located near 
compressor stations and not the compressor stations themselves, the actual pipeline, and all the 
                                                             
xvii Other researchers found similar public apathy in other parts of the world.106 
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supporting infrastructure were subject to OVOS.102 Finally, although formally in compliance with 
the legal requirements, the notice and format of the public meetings had significant shortcomings. 
For example, the notice for the meeting regarding two waste disposal sites at the Amginskaya and 
Nimnyrskaya compressor stations was published in two issues of the national newspaper 
“Transport Rossii” (Russian Transport), one issue of the regional “Yakutia” newspaper, two issues 
of local “Munitsipalny Vestnik” newspaper, as well as on the local government’s web-site. Although 
it is conceivable that the news reached some local population, it certainly avoided indigenous 
people in the forest busy with their reindeer, as well as hunting and fishing. The meeting itself had 
only one person representing the public, the head of a local library. Unsurprisingly, no indigenous 
peoples were present at the meeting. 107 
After finalizing the OVOS documentation, the process moves to the Federal Service for Oversight of 
Natural Resources (Rosprirodnadzor) for an SER. In its essence, SER resembles a project 
documentation review by a group of professionals deemed to have relevant expertise99 An expert 
commission is formed on an ad hoc basis for each individual project from staff and invited experts. 
At this stage, the process is not inclusive as only municipal and provincial governments have the 
right to recommend their own experts to serve and observers at an expert commission meeting. 99 
Deliberation is limited to a discussion among experts at the commission’s meeting. All seven waste 
disposal facilities associated with the pipeline did not appear to have any issues at the SER stage. 
Interestingly, expert commissions for all seven sites were formed on the same date. Furthermore, 
all of them were approved on the same date, right before the deadline.102  
In addition to SER, “On Environmental Review” sets forth perhaps the most inclusive mechanism 
that offers the most capacity for deliberation the so-called public environmental assessment.99 This 
type of assessment is in not mandatory and can be initiated by an NGO initiated, citizens, and a local 
government.99 A party wishing to conduct a public environmental assessment, must petition the 
local government to allow it. The government may decline the petition on several grounds. A 
project or activity information about which may contain “commercial secrets” gives government 
officials an easy reason to deny the petition as virtually any economic activity or project contains 
such sensitive information.99 The practical effect of public environmental assessments is dampened 
by the fact that their results are not binding. The only requirement posed by “On Environmental 
Review” is that a public environmental assessment must be considered during the SER, which is 
always mandatory. 
The Law of Sakha (Yakutia) “On Ethnological Review in the Areas Traditionally Occupied and 
Utilized by Indigenous Small-numbered People of the Republic Sakha’s (Yakutia) North” (“On 
Ethnological Review”) creates another opportunity for indigenous deliberation and inclusion into 
the decision-making process. Pursuant to Article 3, the principal objectives of the statute are to 
identify risks to indigenous communities posed by industrial activities and projects, to avoid or 
mitigate such risks, and, when appropriate, offset impacts with monetary compensation.108  
On Ethnological Review is triggered if a project or activity is proposed to take place in traditionally 
indigenous areas and it affects the environment that indigenous peoples traditionally have 
inhabited or their socio-cultural status quo.108 Indigenous people have the right to delegate 
representatives to participate in an ethnological expert commission. They have the right to 
participate directly in the assessment only in the case if preparation and development of federal 
and regional programs directed at environmental protection and natural resource development.108 
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This participatory right is especially important because gives indigenous people access to strategic 
decision-making. At least in theory “On Ethnological Review” comes with real legal power because 
no activity or project that is subject to the assessment can proceed without an ethnological expert 
commission approval.108  
Unfortunately the implementation of the statute is hampered by significant formal shortcomings. 
The former originates from articles 71 and 72 of the Russian Constitution that create a joint 
(federal and provincial) jurisdiction over indigenous affairs.109110 However, pursuant to article 76, 
provincial laws cannot contradict federal laws and if they do, federal law prevails. This provision 
presents developers with a strong argument against any additional restrains imposed by provincial 
law. For example, a decision to deed an area for recreational use under the federal Forest Code can 
trump a decision to designate an area for traditional use made under provincial law. 110 
The results of our fieldwork and legal analysis indicate that the Power of Siberia undoubtedly falls 
within the purview of the On Ethnological Review and thus, requires an ethnological assessment. 
The pipeline crosses areas traditionally inhibited by indigenous reindeer herders, fisherman, and 
hunters. The impacted indigenous peoples have already expressed their concerns over allocation of 
some areas used as traditional reindeer pastures and hunting grounds for the pipeline construction. 
The indigenous forest dwellers are also concerned about the influx of temporary workers and the 
lasting socio-economic changes that such migration brings.  
However, despite the fact that the pipeline construction commenced in September 2014, an 
ethnological assessment is yet to occur. Although we are not familiar with any formal discourse 
regarding this rather glaring omission, Gazprom’s informal position about which we learned during 
our fieldwork is that because the Power of Siberia will run parallel to the ESPO pipeline, it will not 
create new impacts, thus, it will not need an additional ethnological assessment. Another reason 
why it is difficult for the regional government compel a powerful developer to conduct an 
ethnological assessment is because areas of traditional habitation and subsistence of indigenous 
peoples have not been formally designated as such.111 Instead, the regional government engages 
with developers on an ad hoc basis trying to persuade developers to carry out the assessment. For 
example, Pavel Marynychev, a provincial deputy prime minister stated that the regional 
government “almost reached an agreement” with Gazprom to conduct an ethnological assessment 
of an area located at the Chayandinskoe gas field.112 
VI. Conclusion 
The Power of Siberia together with the development of Chayandinskoe and Kovyktinskoe gas 
deposit is set to become a project that will impact the socio-economic life of Eastern Siberia for 
many years. The discourse regarding potential benefits of the project certainly reflects its “system-
forming” nature. However, the current system of identifying and scrutinizing the project’s risk treat 
the Power of Siberia pipeline as a conglomeration of isolated industrial projects that are only 
remotely related to each other. 
It is not difficult for a government official located thousands of kilometers from the project to 
rationalize such a compartmentalization. The compartmentalization comes with answerable 
research questions and scientific methods. Holistic approach is complicated, messy, and expensive. 
It raises additional questions some of which experts struggle to answer. Yet an indigenous reindeer 
herder in Yakutia does not see the process any other way. The plethora of sub-contractors each 
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responsible for its own part of the project brings a great deal of interruption to the socio-economic 
fabric of local communities. Such “invasions” are seen as a sign of chaos to be brought on the 
indigenous land. Roads, quarries, individual outbuildings, and other infrastructure comprise the 
physical side of the chaos. They pepper the forest landscape with examples of industrialization that 
will remain there long after their human creators are gone.  
Thus, a mind of a reindeer herder or a hunter has a qualitatively different point of departure for 
dealing with risk. It emphasizes risk identification within the totality of all possible risks over a 
model that focuses on an in-depth analysis of a selected few risks while ignoring others, sometimes 
simply because they are difficult to quantify. It also does not limit itself to a particular time period 
because life and practice do not stop. Some spatial movements and temporal interruptions 
notwithstanding, by and large, the life of a reindeer herder and a hunter, his family, and community 
occur in the same geographic area and depend on the continuity of practice.  
As we noted above, the Power of Siberia comes with many risks that were not subject to mandatory 
review and deliberation. Yet if these risks come to fruition, they will not be limited to the impacts 
on Gazprom’s financial bottom line and physical environmental damages. They are certain to affect 
many lives and livelihoods in Eastern Siberia because Power of Siberia is thought to be the “system-
forming” infrastructure and project intended to be one of the pillars of the region’s economy. Power 
of Siberia also comes with a bundle of geopolitical implications wrapped in a thirty-year 
commitment, which given historically uneven relationships between Russia and China can produce 
significant ripples on both sides of the border, as well as internationally. 
It would have been naïve for us to suggest that a direct and literal application of the observed local 
approach to risk would produce a comprehensive and immediate solution. As we highlighted in this 
article, the applicable Russian policy, legal, regulatory regime remains unwelcoming to integration 
of various types of knowledge and rationalities. However, we think that there are pathways for 
integrating the concept of indigenous approach to risk that can contribute to building capacity to 
handle systemic risks posed by energy mega-projects.  
The first pathway is integration of multiple rationalities and types of knowledge into the risk 
governance process. We do not suggest that government or corporate decision-makers should try 
channeling their inner forest dweller and see the world as a whole. After all, these kinds of 
decisions involve people, spaces, and relationships deeply imbedded in advanced modernity. 
Largely owing to their advanced modernity origin, the current government and corporate decision-
makers bring types of knowledge and rationalities not known indigenous hunters and reindeer 
herders. Hence, what is important here is reconciliation of different data, views, and positions. 
Whether it is referred to as “inclusive participation” or “communicative rationality” the overall 
objective of this process should be determining what is at stake for all directly and indirectly 
affected parties thereby reducing “mental” compartmentalization. 
xviii
113114 Furthermore, justice and 
equity considerations should be given priority over economic efficiency as the basis for evaluating 
spatial and temporal distribution of risks and benefits of the proposed activity or project.  Finally, 
                                                             
xviii A skeptic would point at failed earlier attempts to bring laypeople and experts into the risk analysis 
process. It is important to note that such attempts were made prior to the emergence of risk governance. This 
concept not only argues for inclusion of deliberation in risk analysis, it also provides roles for different 
stakeholders that go beyond the traditional experts and laypeople divide.  
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the concept of “collective agency” may become useful to level the balance of negotiating power and 
to increase process efficiency.115 When various stakeholders, local non-indigenous and indigenous 
population, for example, group together to share their perception of risk and to evaluate risks and 
benefits, they form a unified position on how to deal with risk. They can also do so in parallel with 
other stakeholder groups thereby making the process more efficient. This, of course, means that the 
government and industry, the two actors usually not requiring group representation, must be 
prepared to consider and act upon the divergent rationalities and types of knowledge expressed in 
stronger unified voices. 
The second pathway targets diminishing spatial and physical compartmentalization by enlarging 
the scope of a project or activity subject to risk governance. As we noted throughout this article, 
reducing a transnational pipeline system, viability of which depends on the concurrent 
development of two natural gas fields, to a few isolated industrial infrastructure units does not 
position it for a comprehensive analysis. Because risks associated with each of the aforementioned 
waste disposal sites are viewed as belonging to that particular compressor station, systemic risks 
associated with the construction and operation of a $70 billion energy megaproject are not 
considered at all. On the other hand, the Russian leadership and Gazprom are not shy at touting the 
systemic benefits of the Power of Siberia pipeline distorting the cost – benefit analysis. Bringing 
large, systemic risk-laden projects and activities back within the purview of On Environmental 
Review will be a step in the right direction. Adopting an SEA framework and extending it to socio-
economic risks and impacts will be a start of thoughtful policy. 
The third pathway is the expansion of the timeline that used to assess and evaluate a project or 
activity. Even when a “baseline” is mandated to assess ensuing negative consequences, it represents 
is a snapshot of usually environmental conditions prior to the proposed project or activity. Such 
view disregards the existence of environmental, socio-economic, and political processes and 
practices that resulted in the “snapshot.” It also ignores potential disruptions to the processes and 
practices during and after a project or activity. Thus, moving the temporal goalposts is likely to 
reveal the aforementioned temporal continuity, which in turn should put it on the list of items 
considered during the risk assessment and risk evaluation process. 
The fourth pathway is the adoption of a meaningful “zero option,” a scenario under which an 
activity or a project does not go forward. Much of the criticism of the environmental assessment 
framework in the Russian Federation and ethnological assessment in Sakha is focused on the flaws 
in its implementation and enforcement. For example, as we noted in this article construction of 
both the ESPO and Power of Siberia pipelines commenced before environmental and ethnographic 
assessments were conducted. We believe that a presence of a meaningful zero-option would have 
forced the corporate decision-makers to think long and hard before investing heavily in the projects 
that could have become obsolete with a single resolution of an expert commission. However, a 
larger implication of not being able to say no to a pipeline, factory, or a mine is the preclusion of 
exploring other qualitatively divergent means of obtaining societal benefits. And such determinism 
hardly qualifies as a pathway to flourishing life, indigenous or not. 
Acknowledgements 
We thank the Grigorievy family from the obschina Bugat, Lebedev Anatoly Zakharovich, Nadezhda 
Gerasimova, Tatiana Tikhonova, Vyacheslav Shadrin, Ekaterina Evseeva, as well as many others 
who shared their perceptions and opinions with us. We also gratefully acknowledge funding for 
26 
 
fieldwork from the Northeastern Federal University, as part of the grant “Preservation and 
Development of the Cultures of North East Russia,” from the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
in the project “Indigenous peoples and resource extraction in the Arctic: evaluating ethical 
guidelines, QZA-13/0528,” the Norwegian High North Programme grant “Security, Geopolitical, and 
Governance Challenges in relation to Arctic Extractive Industries, HNP-2014/10042, and the 





1 H. Lund, Statoil's Strategy and Ambitions, Presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2014, May 6, http://csis.org/multimedia/audio-statoils-strategy-and-ambitions (accessed 1 Nov. 2015) 
2 E. Rosa O. Renn & A. McCright, The Risk Society Revisited, 2, 20-22, 33-34, 71, 112-114, 139 (Temple 
University Press 2014). 
3 Gazprom, Power of Siberia, http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/ykv/ 
(accessed 31 Dec. 2015). 
4 Sakha Republic, Russia, Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/place/Sakha-republic-Russia 
(accessed 18 Mar. 2016)  
5 G. P. Khariutschi, Innovation Traditions in the Nenets Ethnos Culture (Tomsk University Publishers 2001) 
(Rus). 
6 E. Liarskaia, Northern Boarding Schools and Transformation of the Traditional Culture (European 
University, Ethnology and Anthropology, St. Petersburg. 2003) (Rus). 
7 F. Stammler& A. Ivanova, Resources, Rights and Communities: Extractive Mega-projects and Local People in 
the Russian Arctic” forthcoming in Europe Asia Studies (2016). 
8 B. Simpson, Ethical Moments: Future Directions for Ethical Review and Ethnography, Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute (N.S) 17 (2011) 377-393. 
9 Institute for Energy and the Environment, Vermont Law School, B. Baker et al., Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas 
Guidelines in Greenland and the Russian Federation, Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines White Paper No. 5 
(Feb. 2011).  
10 Federal Law dated as of 30 April 1999 N. 82-FZ “On “On Guarantees of Indigenous Small-numbered 
Peoples’ Rights” art. 1, http://pravo.gov.ru/ (accessed 1 Dec 2015) (Rus). 
11 Federal Law of the Russian Federation Dated as of 21 February 1992 N 2395-I On Subsoil Resources, last 
amended on 29 June 2015, http://pravo.gov.ru/ (accessed 1 Sep 2015) (Rus).   
12 Code of the Russian Federation Dated as of 29 December 2004, N. 190-FZ “City Building Code of the Russian 
Federation”, http://pravo.gov.ru/ (accessed 1 Sep 2015) (Rus).  
13 Consultant, http://www.consultant.ru/ (accessed 18 Mar. 2016). 
14 President of Russia, Documents, http://kremlin.ru/acts/news (accessed 18 Mar. 2016). 
15 A Bryman Social Research Methods Oxford (Oxford University Press 2008). 
16 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Terms & Acronyms, Environmental Risk, 
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/sor_internet/registry/termreg/searchandretrieve/termsandacronyms/search.do;jse
ssionid=vnhTRwzX5tTN161GGyTTGkw2vtGGJzYTqK3jJJhlpwbT3hQJsKg0!410100326 (accessed 1 Sep 2015). 
17 T. Aven and O. Renn, On Risk Defined as an Event Where the Outcome is Uncertain, Journal of Risk Research 
12:1 (2009) 1-11. 
                                                             
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
18 A.V. Whyte & I. Burton eds. Environmental Risk Assessment 1 (1980). 
19 IRGC, Risk Governance: Towards and Integrative Approach, White Paper 19 (Sep. 2005) hereinafter, IRGC 
2005. 
20 B. Sovacool, R. Sidortsov and B. Jones, Energy Security, Equality, and Justice 178 (Routledge 2013). 
21 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Deep Water: The Gulf Oil 
Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling Report to the President xi (2011). 
22 S. Oltedal et al. Explaining Risk Perception An Evaluation of Cultural Theory 11 (2004). 
23 U. Beck, Living in the World Risk Society, Economy and Society, 35:3(2006) 329-345, 330. 
24 U. Beck Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage, 1992) 
25 D. J. Crawford-Brown Risk-Based Environmental Decisions: Methods and Culture 4 – 12 (1999). 
26 O. Renn et al., The Rational Actor Paradigm in Risk Theories: Analysis and Critique, Working Paper, Social 
Contexts and Responses to Risk 1, http://www.kent.ac.uk/scarr/events/finalpapers/renn.pdf (accessed 21 
Sep 2015). 
27 John Adams, Risk 8, 69 (Routledge 2005). 
28 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, Questions and Answers about the Spill, 
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/?FA=facts.QA (accessed 21 Sep 2015). 
29 Education Scotland, Piper Alpha Disaster, 
http://www.educationscotland.gov.uk/scotlandshistory/20thand21stcenturies/piperalpha/index.asp 
(accessed 21 Sep 2015). 
30 B. Baker & R. Sidortsov, The Legal and Regulatory Regime for Offshore Hydrocarbon Resources in the U.S. 
Arctic, in Energy Law in the 21st Century: Views from the U.S. and Russia, American Bar Association, at 38 
Section of Environment, Energy and Resources, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources.html (accessed 21 Sep 2015) 
31 Letter from James A. Watson, Director of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, to Dr. 
Walter D. Cruickshank, Chairman of the Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee, Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, 14 Aug. 2013 
http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/About_BSEE/Public_Engagement/Ocean_Energy_Safety_Advisory
_Committee/BSEE%20Response%20Web%20Version%20081413.pdf (accessed 11 Sep 2015). 
32 The International Regulatory Structures for Offshore Exploration, Presentation at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, 9 Nov 2010 http://csis.org/multimedia/audio-international-regulatory-structures-
offshore-exploration (accessed 18 Sep 2015). 
33 The President of Russia, Meeting of the Security Council Regarding the State of Energy Security and Means 
of Achieving It, 13 Dec. 2010, http://news.kremlin.ru/news/9809/print (accessed 13 Sep 2015) (Rus). 
34 The President of Russia, Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Third Arctic International Forum “Arctic, a 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
35 The President of Russia, Meeting of the State Council’s Presidium on Environmental Security, 9 Jun. 2011, 
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1151 (accessed 4 Sep 2015) (Rus).  
36 T. Gustafson Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia (Belknap Press 2012). 
37 The President of Russia, Meeting of the Commission on Modernization and Technological Development of 
the Economy of Russia, 14 Dec. 2010, http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/9819/print (accessed 13 Sep 
2015) (Rus). 
38 US Energy Information Administration, Russia, 28 July 2015, 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS (accessed 1 September 2015). 
39 M. Goldman Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (Oxford University Press 2010). 
40 D. Yergin, Quest: Energy Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (Penguin Books 2012). 
41 US Energy Information Administration, Exports of Crude Oil including Lease Condensate 2012 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/rankings/#?prodact=57-4&cy=2012&pid=57&aid=4&tl_id=4-
A&tl_type=a, (accessed 13 Sep 2015). 
42 The President of Russia, Meeting of the Commission on the Strategy of Fuel and Energy Sector Development 
Environmental Security, 4 Jun. 2014, http://news.kremlin.ru/news/45831/print (accessed 13 Sep 2015) 
(Rus). 
43 Keun-Wook Paik, Sino-Russian Oil and Gas Cooperation: The Reality and Implications (The Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies, 2012). 
44 T. Van de Graaf and B. Sovacool, Thinking big: Politics, progress, and security in the management of Asian 
and European energy megaprojects, Energy Policy, 16 (2014) 16-27. 
45 L.P. Lunden and D. Fjaertoft, Government Support to Upstream Oil & Gas in Russia How Subsidies Influence 
the Yamal LNG and Prirazlomnoe Projects Report, 10, 41 (IISD, 2014). 
46 R. Sidortsov, Measuring Our Investment in the Carbon Status Quo: Case Study of the New Oil Development 
in the Russian Arctic, Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 13 (2012), 613–650, 615. 
47 Nation’s Capital, ‘Gazprom Has Allowed to Move ‘Power of Siberia’s’ Commission to 2021, http://kapital-
rus.ru/lite/larticle/1149 (accessed 10 Sep 2015) (Rus). 
48 G. Kaufman and K. Scott, What is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?, 
Independent Review 7(3) (2003) 371-391, 372. 
49 Although Kaufman and Scott came up with the definition in the context to risks to financial systems, it cuts 
across different sectors and disciplines. 
50 IRGC, An Introduction to IRGC Risk Governance Framework (2008). 
51 A. Klinke and O. Renn, Systemic Risks as Challenge for Policy Making in Risk Governance, Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research, 7:1 (2006), 3. 
52 T. Treadgold, Merrill Lynch Says Russia's Gas Deal With China Was A Political Win But A Business Loss, 
Forbes, 28 May 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/timtreadgold/2014/05/28/merrill-lynch-says-russias-
gas-deal-with-china-was-a-political-win-but-a-business-loss/ (accessed 10 Sep 2015). 
30 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
53 E.C. Chow and M. Lelyveld, Russia-China Gas Deal and Redeal, CSIS, http://csis.org/publication/russia-
china-gas-deal-and-redeal (accessed 10 Oct 2015).  
54 The President of Russia, Meeting of the Participant of the Global Leadership Summit, 23 May 2014, 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/21078 (accessed 10 Sep 2015). The President of Russia, Meeting 
with the Heads of Global News Agencies, 23 May 2014, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/21090 
(accessed 10 Sep 2015) (Rus). 
55 Gazprom, Eastern Gas Program, http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/east-program/, 
(accessed 10 Sep 2015). 
56 O. Renn, Risk Governance: Towards an Integrative Approach (Geneva, International Risk Governance 
Council 2006). 
57 A. Klinke and O. Renn, Adaptive and integrative governance on risk and uncertainty, Journal of Risk 
Research, 15:3 (2012) 273–292. 
58 B.H. MacGillivray, Heuristics Structure and Pervade Formal Risk Assessment, Risk Analysis 34:4 (2014) 
771-787. 
59 T. Kumpula, B. Forbes & F. Stammler.  Remote Sensing and Local Knowledge of Hydrocarbon Exploitation: 
The Case of Bovanenkovo, Yamal Peninsula, West Siberia, Russia. Arctic 63:2 (2010) 165-178. 
60 N. Johnson, N., Alessa, L., Behe, C., Danielsen, F., Gearheard, S., Gofman-Wallingford & V. Svoboda, M,. The 
Contributions of Community-Based Monitoring and Traditional Knowledge to Arctic Observing Networks: 
Reflections on the State of the Field, Arctic 68:5 (2015) 28. 
61 P. Nadasdy, Hunters and Bureaucrats: Power, Knowledge, and Aboriginal-State Relations in the Southwest 
Yukon (Vancouver, UBC Press. 2003). 
62 P. Nadasdy, Reevaluating the Co-management Success Story. Arctic, 56:4 (2003), 367–380.  
63 P. Nadasdy, Adaptive co-management and the gospel of resilience, in D. Armitage, F. Berkes, & N. Doubleday 
(Eds.), Adaptive co-management: collaboration, learning and multi-level governance, 208–227 (Vancouver, 
UBC Press 2007). 
64 M. G. Stevenson, Indigenous Knowledge in Environmental Assessment, Arctic, 49:3 (1996) 278–291. 
65 F. Stammler & A. Ivanova, Confrontation, coexistence or co-ignorance? Negotiating human-resource 
relations in two Russian regions. The Extractive Industries and Society 3:1 (2016)60–72.  
66 C. O’Faircheallaigh, Extractive industries and Indigenous peoples: A changing dynamic?, Journal of Rural 
Studies 30 (2013) 20–30. 
67 T. Ingold & T. Kurttila, Perceiving the environment in Finnish Lapland, Body and Society 6 (2000) 183-196, 
184. 
68 O. A. Murashko, What is the Ethnological Expertise in Russia? 77–94. 
69 W.K. Dallman, V. Peskov, O.A. Murashko & E. Khmeleva, Reindeer herders in the Timan-Pechora oil 
Province of Northwest Russia: An Assessment of Interacting Environmental, Social, and Legal Challenges, 
Polar Geography 34:4 (2011) 229 – 247 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
70 W.K. Dallman, V. Peskov, O.A. Murashko, Monitoring of Development of Traditional Indigenous Land Use 
Areas in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, NW Russia, Norwegian Polar Institute Vol. 138 (2010). 
71 N.I. Novikova & E.P. Martynova, Taz Nentsy and Oil and Gas Development: Ethnological Review (2011) 
(Rus).  
72 N.I. Novikova, T.N. Vasilkova, A.V. Evay & E.P. Martynova, Indigenous Small-numbered and Industrial Arctic 
Development (Ethonological Monitoring in Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District) (Moscow-Shadrinsk 2011) 
(Rus). 
73 N.I. Novikova Hunters and Oilmen: Legal Anthropology Investigation (Moscow Nauka 2014).  
74 N. Yakovleva & T. Alabaster, Tri-sector Partnership for Community Development in Mining: a Case Study of 
the SAPI Foundation and Target Fund in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Resources Policy, 29:3-4 (2003) 83–
98. 
75 N. Yakovleva. Oil Pipeline Construction in Eastern Siberia: Implications for Indigenous People, Geoforum, 
42:6 (2011) 708–719. 
76 N. Yakovleva, Oil Sector Developments in Russia and Indigenous People, Oil, Gas & Energy Law Journal 
(OGEL), 9:4 (2011).  
77 N. Yakovleva, Land, oil and indigenous people in the Russian North: A case study of the oil pipeline and 
Evenki in Aldan in E Gilberthorpe & G. Hilson eds. Natural Resource Extraction and Indigenous Livelihoods. 
147-178 (Ashgate 2014). 
78 Law of the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic Dated as of 14 April 2010 820-3 N 537-IV “On Ethnological Review in 
the Areas Traditionally Occupied and Utilized by Indigenous Small-numbered People of the Republic Sakha’s 
(Yakutia) North,” art. 3, http://www.sakha.gov.ru/node/26210 (accessed 20 Oct. 2015). 
79 G. Fondahl & A.A. Sirina, Rights and Risks: Evenki Concerns Regarding the Proposed Eastern Siberia - 
Pacific Ocean Pipeline, In E. Wilson & F. Stammler (Eds.), Special issue on the Oil and Gas Industry, Local 
Communities and the State, Sibirica (2006) 115–138). 
80 A. Ivanova, The Price of Progress in Eastern Siberia: Problems of ecological Legislation and Political Agency 
in a Russian Region, In Paula Kankaanpää, Sanna Ovaskainen, Leo Pekkala (eds). Knowledge and power in the 
Arctic: proceedings of a conference in Rovaniemi 16-18 April 2007, Rovaniemi: Arctic Centre Report 48 
(2007) 61-69. 
81 D. Turnbull, Introduction: Futures for Indigenous Knowledges, Futures: Special Issue on The Futures of 
Indigenous Knowledges, Guest Editor David Turnbull, 41:1 (2009) 1-5. 
82 D. Turnbull, Masons, Tricksters and Cartographers: Comparative Studies in the Sociology of Scientific and 
Indigenous Knowledge (Routledge. 2003 2nd ed). 
83 H. P. Huntington, Using Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Science: Methods and Applications. Ecological 
Applications, 10:5 (2000)1270.  
84 C.R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151:3 (2003) 
1003-1058, 1009-1010. 
85 B. Forbes & F. Stammler, Arctic Climate Change Discourse: The Contrasting Politics of Research Agendas in 
the West and Russia, Polar Research, 28:1 (2009) 28–42. 
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
86 Interviews with the late Khasovo Puiko, Bovanenkovo Gas field, Yamal, August 2012. 
87 T. Ingold, The perception of the environment: essays in livelihood, dwelling and skill (Routledge 2000). 
88 D. Anderson, Identity and ecology in Arctic Siberia: the number one reindeer brigade (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2000). 
89 Phenomenology, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ 
(accessed 18 Mar. 2016). 
90 T. Ingold, Bush Base: Forest Farm. Culture, Environment and Development in Culture and the perception of 
the environment, 39–56 (E. Croll & D. Parkin eds., Routledge, 1992). 
91 F. Stammler & A. Ivanova, Fieldwork notes, Aytalina Grigorieva, Neryungryi, November 2014, January 2015. 
92 E. Landerer, Hunting, Walking, Reindeer Keeping: places and movements among the Evenki of Eastern 
Siberia, Unpublished MPhil Dissertation, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge (2009). 
93 Interview with Valentin Ivanov, Gazprom pipeline builder, Nadym, 1 April 2008 (Rus). 
94 Structured video interview, Neryungryi, 27 Jan 2015. 
95 N. Mazzullo, The sense of time in the north: a Sámi perspective, Polar Record, 48:3 (2012) 214-222. 
96 A. Bolotova, Loving and Conquering Nature: Shifting Perceptions of the Environment in the Industrialised 
Russian North, Europe-Asia Studies, 64:4 (2012) 645–671. 
97 R. Sidortsov, Reinventing Rules for Environmental Risk Governance in the Energy Sector, Energy Research 
& Social Science 1:1 (2014) 171-182, 177, 178. 
98 C.R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
99 Federal Law Dated as of 23 November 1995 N 175-FZ “On Environmental Review,” last amended on 13 July 
2015, arts. 1, 4, 6.1, 9, 14-18, 20, 24 (accessed 1 Sep. 2015) (Rus). 
100 The President of Russia, Transcript of the State Council’s Presidium Meeting on Improving Government 
Regulation of Matters Concerning Environmental Protection, 27 May 2010, 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/7872 (accessed 1 Sep. 2015) (Rus). 
101 Federal Law Dated as of 18 December 2006 N 232-FZ, “On Amendments to the City-Building Code of the 
Russian Federation and Other Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation” http://pravo.gov.ru/ (accessed 20 
Oct. 2015) (Rus). 
102 Federal Service for Oversight of Natural Resources (Rosprirodnadzor), Information about the Projects and 
Activities Subject to Environmental Assessment at the Federal Level as of 29 October 2015, arts. 1.1, 4.3, 
http://rpn.gov.ru/, (accessed 20 Oct. 2015) (Rus) 
103 State Committee of the Russian Federation on Protection of the Environment, Order Dated as of 16 May 
2000 N 372 “On Affirmation of the Regulations for Environmental Impact Assessments,” Sec. 3, 
http://pravo.gov.ru/ (accessed 20 Oct. 2015) (Rus). 
104 Megaprojects, Construction of the ESPO Oil Pipeline, Yakutia Commercial Bulletin, 27 Oct. 2006 (Rus).  
33 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
105 Petition from the Leadership of Yakutsk Regional Bureau of the Yabloko Party’s “Green Russia” Caucus and 
Non-Governmental Organizations of Sakha (Yakutia) Republic Regarding the Construction of the ESPO 
Pipeline to the President of Sakha Republic V.A. Shtyrov, Head of the Legislative Council (Il Tyman) of Sakha 
Republic N.S. Timofeev, and Head of the Sakha Republic’s Government E.A. Borisov, 
http://newsbabr.com/?IDE=31367 (accessed 20 Oct. 2015) (Rus). 
106 M Tironi, Disastrous publics: Counter-enactments in participatory experiments. Science, Technology & 
Human Values, 2014:1–24. 
107 Minutes of Public Hearings (Discussion) of Project Documentation, 25 October, Aldan, Sakha (Yakutia) 
Republic (on file with authors)(Rus). 
108 Law of the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic Dated as of 14 April 2010 820-3 N 537-IV “On Ethnological Review in 
the Areas Traditionally Occupied and Utilized by Indigenous Small-numbered People of the Republic Sakha’s 
(Yakutia) North,” art. 3, 1, 5, 8, http://www.sakha.gov.ru/node/26210 (accessed 20 Oct. 2015). 
109 Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993. 
110 A.N. Sleptsov, Ethnological Review in the Areas Traditionally Occupied and Utilized by Indigenous Small-
numbered People of the North: Experience Applying the Law on the Regional Level, Eurasian Legal Journal, 
12:67 (2013). 
111 State Council(Il Tyman) of Sakha (Yakutia) Republic, Criteria for Designating Territories as Areas of 
Traditional Occupation and Use Were Discussed in Il Tyman, 27 Feb. 2015, http://iltumen.ru/node/14373 
(accessed 20 Oct. 2015) (Rus). 
112 Power of Siberia, 2 Sep. 2015, GTRK Sakha, http://www.sakha.gov.ru/section/32 (accessed 20 Oct. 2015) 
(Rus). 
113 S. Owens, T. Reyner and O. Bina, New Agendas for Appraisal: Reflections on Theory, Practice, and 
Research, Environment and Planning, 36:11 (2004) 1943-1959. 
114 J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Thomas McCarthy, Beacon, 1975) 
115 F. Stammler and E. Wilson, Dialogue for Development: An Exploration of Relations between Oil and Gas 
Companies, Communities, and the State, 5:2 (2006) 1-42. 
 
